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Individual investors’ wealth was hit hard by the financial crisis of 2007–2009. Several months of 
double-digit negative stock-market returns almost halved investor portfolio values within the 
time period studied in this paper (April 2008 to March 2009). This dramatic shock to investor 
wealth, combined with the market’s high uncertainty and extreme volatility, may have induced 
individual investors to radically change their perceptions of the stock market and their 
investment behavior. According to the popular press, for example, the crisis made investors 
aware of the true risk of investing in stocks, lowered their return expectations and risk tolerance, 
increased their risk perceptions, and led them to de-risk their portfolios (Steverman 2009; Shell 
2010). Surprisingly, however, academic research on these issues remains scarce to date.  
 We fill this void in the literature and provide a comprehensive analysis of individual 
investor perceptions, their behavior, and the impact of perceptions on behavior during the 
financial crisis. To do so, we employ a unique panel-data set in which we combine monthly 
survey data with matching brokerage records. For each month between April 2008 and March 
2009, we measure individual investors’ perceptions in a survey on their expectations for stock-
market returns, as well as their risk tolerance and risk perceptions.1 In addition, we collect 
information on these investors’ trading and risk-taking behavior through their brokerage records. 
The sample period includes, on the one hand, the months when worldwide stock markets were 
hit hardest, that is, September and October 2008. During these months, in the U.S., Lehman 
Brothers collapsed and AIG was bailed out, and in Europe, parts of ABN AMRO and Fortis were 
nationalized. On the other hand, stock markets were still relatively calm at the start of the sample 
period (April 2008), while at the end of the sample period, stock markets began to recover 
(March 2009). As such, the sample period provides a relatively complete coverage of the crisis. 
                                                 
1
 Whenever we do not specifically refer to return expectations, risk tolerance, or risk perceptions, the term 
“perceptions” is used to refer to these survey variables in a general way to set them apart from the brokerage data. 
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The results of this paper show that investor perceptions fluctuate significantly during the 
crisis, with risk tolerance and risk perceptions being less volatile than return expectations. At the 
start of the crisis, return expectations and risk tolerance sharply decline, while risk perceptions 
strongly increase. Towards the end of the crisis, however, return expectations, risk tolerance, and 
risk perceptions recover. We find substantial swings in trading and risk-taking behavior that are 
driven by changes in investor perceptions. As perceptions recover, trading and risk-taking 
behavior soon return to pre-crisis levels. In contrast to the expectations of conventional wisdom 
(e.g., Steverman 2009; Shell 2010), the overall pattern of results suggest that the financial crisis 
did not have a particularly long-lasting impact on individual investors’ perceptions and behavior. 
This paper contributes to the literature on the financial crisis by showing for the first time 
how individual investor perceptions change as well as recover and drive behavior during this 
period. Existing studies focus on understanding the crisis’s causes and consequences for housing 
and securitization markets (Piskorski, Seru, and Vig 2010; Demyanyk and Van Hemert 2011), 
financial institutions (Brunetti, di Filippo, and Harris 2011; Maddaloni and Peydró 2011; Gropp, 
Hakenes, and Schnabel 2011), corporate investment decisions (Campello et al. 2011), household 
welfare (Hurd and Rohwedder 2010; Bricker et al. 2011), bank lending (Ivashina and Scharfstein 
2010; Santos 2011), and financial contagion (Longstaff 2010; Tong and Wei 2011). It is 
important to also study the experiences of individual investors, as their aggregate behavior 
impacts stock prices (Kumar and Lee 2006), return volatility (Foucault, Sraer, and Thesmar 
2011), and ultimately even the macro-economy (Korniotis and Kumar 2011). Moreover, the 
economic significance of individual investors’ stock-market participation rises because of an 
increasing self-responsibility for building up retirement wealth.  
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 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents related literature 
and develops hypotheses. Section 2 introduces the data. Section 3 sets out the results. Section 4 
presents robustness checks and evaluates alternative explanations. Section 5 concludes. 
 
1. Literature and Hypotheses 
Prior research shows that individual investors are subject to various behavioral biases, which 
seem to be rather persistent (Barber and Odean 2001; Bailey, Kumar, and Ng 2011). Among 
these, individual investors have difficulty learning from their experiences, and if they learn, this 
is a slow process (Gervais and Odean 2001; Seru, Shumway, and Stoffman 2010). Individual 
investors often fail to update their behavior to match their experiences and are relatively unaware 
of their return performance (Glaser and Weber 2007). Thus, it seems that in normal times, 
investors’ experiences have little or no impact on their perceptions and behaviors. Extreme 
events such as the financial crisis of 2007–2009, however, may have a strong impact on 
individual investors because of their salience (Kahneman and Tversky 1972). De Bondt and 
Thaler (1985), for example, show that investors tend to overreact to unexpected and dramatic 
news events. In addition, Malmendier and Nagel (2011) show that dramatic experiences, such as 
the Great Depression of the 1930s in the U.S., may have a permanent impact on investor 
perceptions and risk-taking behavior. Finally, prior literature suggests that experiencing a 
number of consecutive losses reduces investors’ subsequent willingness to take risks (Thaler and 
Johnson 1990; Barberis 2011). As the financial crisis combines a severe shock to investor wealth 
with a highly uncertain and volatile market environment, we expect a strong and long-lasting 
impact on investor perceptions and behavior. As such, we develop the following hypotheses 
regarding investor perceptions (H1) and risk-taking behavior (H2) during the crisis: 
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H1a: The financial crisis depresses investor perceptions. That is, their return expectations and 
risk tolerance are expected to decrease, while their risk perceptions are expected to increase. 
H1b: These effects on investor perceptions are long-lasting because of the extreme nature of the 
crisis. 
 
H2a: The financial crisis makes investors aware of a higher than previously expected market risk. 
Therefore, individual investors are expected to reduce their portfolio risk during this period. 
H2b: These effects on investor behavior are long-lasting because of the extreme nature of the 
crisis. 
 
During a crisis, investors are exposed to a frequent stream of often dramatic and unexpected 
news events. Prior research shows that receiving (too) much information can lead to information 
overload, which stimulates status-quo bias, thus potentially reducing individual investors’ trading 
activity during a crisis (cf. Agnew and Szykman 2005). Alternatively, however, the large amount 
of new and potentially conflicting information that investors receive during a crisis may induce 
frequent changes in their perceptions, as well as a larger divergence of such perceptions (i.e., 
disagreement amongst various investors). Glaser and Weber (2005), for example, find an 
increase in the standard deviation of individual investors’ return and volatility forecasts directly 
after the terror attacks of September 11 and the subsequent stock-market turmoil. Changes in and 
divergence of perceptions are both expected to lead to higher trading activity: The first effect 
provides more reasons to trade, and the second effect makes it more likely for investors to find a 
trading counterpart (cf. Banerjee 2011). Hence, we develop two mutually exclusive hypotheses 
about individual investors’ trading activity during a financial crisis:  
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H3a: The frequent arrival of new information during the financial crisis leads to information 
overload. As a result, individual investors are expected to reduce their trading activity. 
 
H3b: The frequent arrival of new information during the financial crisis changes investor 
perceptions and creates a larger divergence in their perceptions. As such, having more reasons 
as well as opportunities to trade are expected to increase individual investors’ trading activity. 
 
2. Data 
We base our analyses on the brokerage records of a sample of 1,510 clients of the largest 
discount broker in the Netherlands and on matching monthly questionnaire data that we collected 
for these individual investors from April 2008 through March 2009. Using discount-brokerage 
data ensures that observed trading patterns, as well as survey responses, reflect investors’ own 
decision making and opinions and not those of an advisor. An additional advantage is that 
discount brokers represent the dominant channel through which both U.S. and Dutch individuals 
invest in the stock market today (Barber and Odean 2000; Bauer, Cosemans, and Eichholtz 
2009). As in Bauer et al. (2009), we exclude accounts owned by minors (age < 18 years) and 
accounts with an average end-of-month portfolio value (within the sample period) of less than 
€250. Furthermore, we limit the sample to individual investors. To exclude professional traders, 
we discard accounts in the top 1% of annual trading volume, number of transactions, or turnover 
distributions. Imposing these criteria leaves 1,376 individual accounts for investigation. 
 
2.1 Brokerage Records 
Brokerage records are available for investors who completed at least one survey during the 
sample period. A “record” consists of an identification number, a transaction date and time, a 
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buy/sell indicator, the type of asset traded, the gross transaction value, and transaction 
commissions. The records also contain information on investors’ daily account balances, 
demographics such as age and gender, as well as their 6-digit postal code. Based on this postal 
code, which is unique to each street (or even parts of a street) in the Netherlands, and data from 
Statistics Netherlands (Central Bureau of Statistics), we assign income and residential house 
value to each investor. Variables are defined in Table 1. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics.  
 
[Tables 1-2 here] 
 
A comparison with samples used in other studies of individual investor behavior in the United 
States (Barber and Odean 2000), Germany (Dorn and Huberman 2005), and the Netherlands 
(Bauer et al., 2009) shows that the sample is similar with regard to key characteristics, although 
trading activity is slightly higher. Comparing the average account value of the surveyed investors 
to the average account value of €50,000–60,000 for Dutch individual investors in general (Bauer 
et al., 2009) suggests that the average investor in our sample invests more than three-fourths of 
her total self-managed portfolio with this broker. Over 40% of survey respondents hold an 
investment account only with this particular broker. Of the respondents who also have accounts 
with other brokers, more than 50% indicate that the other account(s) comprise(s) less than half 
their total investment portfolio. Together with the reasons outlined above, this paper’s sample of 
investors seems sufficiently representative to justify extrapolating our results to the broader 
population of self-directed individual investors. As there is no capital gains tax under the Dutch 
tax system, the data and results are not affected by tax-loss selling motivated trading. 
 
8 
 
2.2 Survey Data 
At the end of each month between April 2008 and March 2009, we conducted a survey among a 
panel of the broker’s clients. To develop the panel, we sent an email invitation to 20,000 
randomly selected clients in March 2008. Six months later, a re-invitation was sent to all initially 
invited clients to maintain a sufficient response rate. The initial response rate of 4.28% (April 
2008) is comparable to that of other large-scale surveys (cf. Dorn and Sengmueller 2009). 
 A possible concern with samples of investors such as the one used in this study is that 
monthly variation of non-response (see Table 2) might not be random. For example, investment 
success could be related to the likelihood to respond. Robustness checks in Section 4.1 show that 
our sample is not subject to such non-random response behavior problems. 
 The survey elicited information on investors’ expectations of stock-market returns, their 
risk tolerance, and their risk perceptions for each upcoming month (see Table 3). To ensure a 
valid measurement of these variables, we use tested and well-established scales from the 
psychometric literature (Nunnally and Bernstein 1994). Return expectations reflect the extent to 
which a respondent is optimistic about her investment portfolio and corresponding returns and 
are measured following Weber et al. (2010). Risk tolerance reflects a respondent’s predisposition 
toward financial risk (like or dislike of risky situations) and is measured following Pennings and 
Smidts (2000). Risk perception reflects a respondent’s interpretation of the riskiness of the stock 
market and is measured according to Pennings and Wansink (2004). 
 To ensure a reliable measurement instrument, we use multiple items per variable, include 
these items in the questionnaire in a random order (Netemeyer, Bearden, and Sharma 2003), and 
employ a mixture of regular and reverse-scored items (Nunnally and Bernstein 1994). Reliability 
is high, as Cronbach’s alpha is between 0.71 and 0.89 for the different survey variables (Hair et 
al. 1998). One-factor solutions of exploratory factor analyses confirm the variables’ convergent 
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validity. Additional factor analyses show that cross-loadings between the different survey 
variables are either low or insignificant, confirming their discriminant validity (Nunnally and 
Bernstein 1994). The survey variables are computed by equally weighting and averaging their 
respective item scores. Such variables perform at least as well as those employing “optimally” 
weighted scores using factor analysis, but have the advantage of expressing a readily 
interpretable absolute modal meaning (Dillon and McDonald 2001, p. 62). 
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
3. Tests of Hypotheses 
3.1 Investor Perceptions during the Crisis 
In this section we test hypothesis H1. That is, we examine whether the financial crisis has a 
depressing effect on investor perceptions (H1a), and if so, whether this effect is long-lasting (H1b). 
Figures 1 and 2 show the evolution of individual investors’ return expectations, risk tolerance, 
and risk perceptions during the crisis, as well as the Dutch stock market’s index returns (AEX). 
 
[Figures 1-2 here] 
 
Investors’ return expectations (Figure 1) quickly drop at the onset of the crisis, to reach their 
lowest levels during the height of the crisis (September–October 2008). Afterward, return 
expectations recover. Towards the end of the financial crisis (March 2009), they almost reach 
their level at the beginning of the sample period (April 2008). The rapid recovery of return 
expectations suggests that individual investors did not experience a long-lasting shock to their 
return expectations as a result of the crisis, but instead regularly adapt their expectations to 
changes in return experiences. In addition, Figure 1 highlights that return expectations (measured 
at the end of each month) closely follow past returns. The adaptive evolution of return 
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expectations during the crisis is similar to the adaptation process found in calmer market periods 
(Hurd, van Rooij, and Winter 2011). Moreover, this finding is in line with De Bondt and Thaler’s 
(1985) result that investors overweight the recent past when forming return expectations. 
 We find similar effects for risk tolerance and risk perception (Figure 2), though these 
measures display less fluctuation over the sample period than return expectations. Both risk 
tolerance and risk perception recover towards the end of the crisis. Again, it does not seem that 
the dramatic experiences of the financial crisis either permanently lowered individual investors’ 
risk tolerance or enduringly increased their risk perceptions. Compared to other studies that 
measure investor perceptions during the financial crisis, this study’s longitudinal research design 
and more frequent measurement offer additional insights. Both Bateman et al. (2010) and Weber 
et al. (2010), for example, measure investor perceptions during the financial crisis, but their 
infrequent and long-apart measurements do not detect meaningful changes in risk tolerance and 
risk perceptions. Although this study’s findings confirm the results of Bateman et al. and Weber 
et al. that risk tolerance and risk perception are relatively stable over longer time intervals, we 
find that during the crisis period, they significantly fluctuate and temporarily become depressed. 
 Overall, we find support for hypothesis H1a, but do not find clear evidence for hypothesis 
H1b. Investor perceptions are impacted by the crisis, but they become only temporally depressed, 
and quickly recover with improving market returns. The one-year sample period that is available 
prevents testing very long-lasting effects of the crisis on investor perceptions. Since investor 
perceptions before the most dramatic months of the crisis (September–October 2008) are similar 
to their perceptions afterward, however, any long-term effect, should it exist, is expected to be 
rather small in magnitude in comparison to the monthly fluctuations in investor perceptions.     
 
 
11 
 
3.2 Investor Risk Taking during the Crisis 
In this section we test hypotheses H2. That is, we examine whether the financial crisis leads 
investors to reduce their portfolio risk (H2a), and if so, whether this reduction is long-lasting 
(H2b). To measure portfolio risk, we use the volatility (standard deviation) of investors’ daily 
portfolio returns. Figure 3 shows the monthly volatility of investor returns and the volatility of 
the market index (AEX). Changes in investors’ return volatility track those of the market, while 
being higher, on average. Especially in September–October 2008, investors’ return volatility 
spikes. Thus, during the height of the crisis, investors are not de-risking their portfolios. The 
sharp increase in market risk in this particular period may have come as a surprise to individual 
investors. After September–October 2008, however, when market volatility decreases, individual 
investors’ return volatility remains at a higher level than that of the market, with the magnitude 
of the difference staying at the same level as in September–October. Additional (untabulated) 
tests that consider the cash position in investors’ accounts confirm these results. Total account 
volatility (i.e., the sum of the investment portfolio and cash) is generally lower than portfolio 
volatility (e.g., – 6 percentage points in April 2008). It also spikes at the height of the crisis. 
Again, we find that toward the end of the crisis, account volatility is higher than at its beginning 
(e.g., + 9 percentage points in March 2009 compared with April 2008). Thus, investors are not 
reducing risk by shifting from investments to cash. The results show that during, and also after 
the financial crisis, individual investors do not de-risk their portfolios. 
 
[Figure 3 here] 
 
Instead, individual investors use the depressed asset prices as a chance to enter the market. 
Figure 4 shows individual investors’ monthly buy-sell ratio. Especially during September–
October 2008, the buy-sell ratio increases. Generally, the buy-sell ratio is greater than zero 
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(indicating net buying, on average). This behavior of investors during the crisis mimics the 
findings of Kaniel, Saar, and Titman (2008) for normal stock-market periods and those of Griffin 
et al. (2011) for the technology stock reversal in March 2000. That is, individual investors, on 
average, increase their buying volume after price decreases (and vice-versa).  
 
[Figure 4 here] 
 
To gain more insight into the factors that drive individual investors’ risk-taking behavior, we 
regress their portfolio standard deviation and buy-sell ratio on their perceptions. We run panel 
regressions in which investor perceptions are included as explanatory variables in their one-
month lagged levels and changes (revisions) from that month to infer how perceptions at the start 
of a month, and changes in perceptions during a month, influence behavior. This approach 
differentiates the general effect of levels of investor perceptions (e.g., always having high risk 
tolerance and high trading activity) from specific effects of revisions in perceptions and resulting 
behavior. That is, we examine whether the monthly fluctuations in investor perceptions are an 
important ingredient for understanding investor behavior, or whether only the levels of 
perceptions matter. We control for other investor characteristics that prior literature suggests as 
drivers of investor behavior, such as gender, age, account tenure, income, portfolio value, house 
value, derivative usage, and dividend choice. Results are presented in Table 4. 
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
Table 4 shows that studying the dynamics of investors’ perceptions leads to a better 
understanding of their risk-taking behavior during the crisis. Both the levels of and revisions in 
risk tolerance, as well as the levels of risk perception, are associated with risk taking. That is, 
higher past levels of and upward revisions in risk tolerance lead investors to choose portfolios 
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with higher standard deviations. Furthermore, risk perceptions are positively associated with 
portfolio risk. This result suggests that individual investors are aware of the risk of their 
investment portfolios. The regression coefficients are economically significant, as we examine 
monthly standard deviations. For example, a one-point increase in the past level of risk 
perception increases the annualized standard deviation by almost four percentage points. 
Regarding the control variables, we confirm prior literature. Investors who are more 
experienced (longer account tenure) and confident of their skills (trade derivatives) take more 
risk (cf. Barber and Odean 2001; Bauer, Cosemans, and Eichholtz 2009; Grinblatt and Keloharju 
2009), while investors with larger portfolios take less risk (cf. Shefrin 2002).  
With respect to buy-sell ratios, we find that investors with higher levels of and upward 
revisions in risk tolerance, lower levels of risk perceptions, less experience (shorter account 
tenure), more wealth (higher average house value), and lower levels of derivatives usage have 
higher buy-sell ratios (second column in Table 4). That is, more risk-tolerant investors increase 
their exposure to the market, while investors who perceive higher risk lower their exposure.  
 Overall, the results of this section lead us to reject hypotheses H2a and H2b. The financial 
crisis did not induce individual investors to de-risk their portfolios. This behavior is rooted in the 
time-variation of investor perceptions: Since risk tolerance and risk perception quickly return to 
pre-crisis levels, and these measures are important drivers of portfolio risk and buy-sell ratios, 
investors did not reduce their portfolio risk. Although temporarily dramatic, the crisis thus does 
not seem to have a long-lasting effect on individual investors’ risk-taking behavior. 
 
3.3 Investor Trading Activity during the Crisis 
In this section we test hypothesis H3. That is, we examine whether experiencing a crisis leads 
individual investors to decrease (H3a) or increase (H3b) their trading activity. Figure 5 plots the 
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fraction of investors that trades each month and their turnover, and shows that the likelihood of 
trading and turnover increase sharply during the height of the crisis (September–October 2008).  
 
[Figure 5 here] 
 
The sharp increase in trading activity, as shown in Figure 5, makes it unlikely that information 
overload, and the associated lower trading activity, plays a major role for individual investors 
during the financial crisis. Increasing trading activity alone, however, is insufficient to rule out 
potential information overload effects. Therefore, we also regress investor trading activity on 
their perceptions and variables shown to be linked to susceptibility for information overload. 
Agnew and Szykman (2005) show that financially literate and experienced investors, that is, 
those with longer account tenure, higher income, and larger portfolio values, suffer less from 
information overload. These investors have less difficulty interpreting the frequent and 
sometimes conflicting information that arrives during a crisis. Therefore, we expect them to have 
a lower tendency to be overwhelmed by crisis events that could have led them to refrain from 
trading. As such, if information overload plays an important role, trading activity (i.e., likelihood 
to trade and turnover) should be positively related to financial literacy and experience. We find 
that income is indeed positively related to the likelihood of trading, while other measures of 
investor sophistication display conflicting signs. Table 5 thus confirms the graphical evidence of 
Figure 5: Information overload does not seem to play an important role during the crisis. 
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
As we do not find evidence in support of hypothesis H3a, we next test hypothesis H3b. That is, we 
examine whether more reasons (changes in perceptions) and opportunities to trade (divergence of 
perceptions) explain the increase in trading activity,
 
as observed in Figure 5. Both in the 
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likelihood of trading and the turnover regressions, most perception coefficients are significant 
(Table 5). Exceptions are the coefficients for changes in risk perception (likelihood to trade 
regression), and level and changes in risk tolerance (turnover regression). Overall, levels and 
changes in perceptions drive trading activity. Figures 1 and 2 show that perceptions fluctuate 
significantly during the crisis. Together with the regression results, this implies that having more 
reasons to trade leads investors to increase their trading activity. To measure divergence of 
perceptions (i.e., disagreement between different investors), we use the monthly cross-sectional 
standard deviation of the perception measures (Doukas, Kim, and Pantzalis 2006; Zhang 2006; 
Güntay and Hackbarth 2010; Banerjee 2011). Figure 6 plots the divergence of investor 
perceptions during the crisis and shows that divergence tends to co-move with trading activity. 
These results lead us to reject H3a and accept H3b. That is, the increased trading activity during 
the height of the crisis is related to changes in perceptions as well as higher divergence of 
perceptions. In other words, investors have more reasons as well as more opportunities to trade. 
 
[Figure 6 here] 
 
4. Robustness Checks and Tests of Alternative Explanations 
4.1 Sample Selection Bias 
A general concern with studies using surveys is that response behavior could be non-random. To 
examine this issue, we first compare the investors that responded to the survey to the broker’s 
overall investor population, followed by an analysis of the monthly variation of non-response.  
 As described in Section 2, brokerage records are available only for investors who 
responded at least once to the survey. A limited amount of background information is available 
for all of the broker’s clients for December 2005. This information includes their age, gender, 
portfolio value, and number of trades. After imposing the same sample-selection restrictions for 
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the broker’s complete client base as for the 2008–2009 survey respondents (see Section 2), we 
have background information from 2005 for 35,122 investors in total, of which 742 are also 
respondents to the 2008–2009 survey. A comparison of the 742 survey respondents with all of 
the broker’s clients based on the 2005 data shows that 2008–2009 survey respondents are, on 
average, more likely to be male (95% vs. 91%, p = 0.000) and older (3.25 years, p = 0.000), have 
larger portfolios (€10.956, p = 0.000), and are more likely to trade (55% vs. 39%, p = 0.000). No 
significant differences are found regarding their number of trades (given that they traded).  
In the following, the characteristics of all investors who responded to the 2008–2009 
survey are compared with those of the non-responding investors for each month using the 2008–
2009 brokerage-account data. Table 6 presents mean differences between respondents and non-
respondents. To examine whether non-response is related to investor behavior or performance, 
investors’ trading and risk-taking variables, returns, Sharpe ratios, and alphas are also analyzed.  
 
[Table 6 here] 
 
Comparing respondent with non-respondent means shows that in some months there are 
significant differences, especially with respect to age, account tenure, and trading activity. In 
these months, respondents, compared to non-respondents, are older, have longer account tenure, 
and are more likely to trade, whereas their overall transaction volume is smaller. That is, based 
on the 2008–2009 data, similar tendencies with respect to response behavior emerge as with the 
2005 data. This indicates that investors that responded to the survey only a few times mimic 
investors that did not respond at all. Except for August 2008 (alpha) and December 2008 (Sharpe 
ratio) there are no significant differences between respondents and non-respondents regarding 
risk taking or performance. Thus, response behavior is unlikely to be driven by these investor 
characteristics. When examining the months with significant differences between respondents 
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and non-respondents regarding overall market performance, no clear patterns emerge that 
indicate that response behavior would be driven by overall market developments (Figure 1). 
To account for the identified differences between respondents and non-respondents, as well 
as the monthly variation in significant differences, an inverse-probability-weighted estimator is 
applied (Robins and Rotnitzky 1995; Wooldridge 2002). For each of the 12 months, a logit 
model is estimated where the dependent variable indicates either response (1) or non-response 
(0). As explanatory variables, the set of variables contained in Table 6 is included. Next, the 
predicted probabilities of survey response are calculated. Finally, all regression models of 
Section 3 are estimated again using the inverse of the predicted probabilities as sample weights. 
The results of the regressions that include this estimator are similar to those obtained from the 
original specifications in terms of coefficient magnitudes, significance, and signs (detailed 
results available upon request). Exceptions are the turnover regression where we identify that, 
compared to male investors, female investors have lower turnover  
(β = -0.149, p = 0.085), and the portfolio risk regression, where we find that female investors 
hold less risky portfolios (β = -0.036, p = 0.048). Both results confirm Barber and Odean (2001). 
 
4.2 Investor Perceptions versus Past Returns as Drivers of Behavior 
Figures 1 and 2 suggest that the month-to-month changes (revisions) in investors’ perceptions 
follow changes in the Dutch stock market index (AEX). In particular, revisions in return 
expectation and risk tolerance seem to be positively, and revisions in risk perception negatively, 
associated with changes in market returns. Hence, one could hypothesize that perceptions have a 
significant effect in the regression analyses only because they reflect past returns (cf. Statman, 
Thorley, and Vorkink 2006; Barber, Odean, and Zhu 2007; Nicolosi, Peng, and Zhu 2009).  
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To examine this alternative explanation, Panels A and B of Table 7 first present the 
correlations of the levels of and revisions in perceptions with the levels of and changes in the 
market and individual investor returns, respectively. Since perceptions are measured at the end of 
each month, while returns are realized over the course of each month, Table 7 contains the 
contemporaneous correlations to detect an impact of past returns on current perceptions. 
 
[Table 7 here] 
 
Although the levels and changes in perceptions are correlated with both the levels and changes in 
the market and individual investor returns, all correlations are relatively low and far from unity. 
This gives first evidence that investors’ perceptions provide additional information over and 
beyond the information included in their past returns. In addition, Table 8 breaks down the 
changes in investor perceptions on a monthly basis and distinguishes between investors with 
positive and negative past returns, as well as changes in past returns. 
 
[Table 8 here] 
 
Table 8 shows that, in most months, average return expectations and risk tolerance move in the 
same direction, while risk perceptions move in the opposite direction of both market returns 
(Panel A) and individual investor returns (Panel B). There is, however, considerable 
heterogeneity between the directions of investors’ changes in perceptions. The maximum 
percentage of investors that changes perceptions in line with the average change of the overall 
sample of investors is 77% (= negative change in return expectations in June 2008). In most 
months, this percentage is lower than 60% (Panel A). Moreover, when looking closer at 
individual investor returns, which may be the source of heterogeneity of the direction of changes 
in investor perceptions, it becomes clear that it is not only individuals’ past return experience that 
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drives changes in their perceptions. Panel B of Table 8 shows that the fraction of investors that 
change their perceptions in line with the change in the overall market return is larger among 
investors with an individual return experience that matches the sign (direction) of the market 
return (change). Thus, investor perceptions are partially influenced by past individual returns. 
The effect of past individual returns is small, however, because the difference between the 
fractions of investors with positive and negative individual return experience that change 
perceptions in line with the market is usually less than 10 percentage points.   
Finally, we analyze the impact of investor past return experience versus investor 
perceptions on their trading and risk-taking behavior. Since the possible impact of the past 
market return (AEX) on investor behavior is already accounted for by the time fixed effects that 
are included in the regression models of Section 3, only the possible impact of individual 
investor return experience is examined further. For this, we again estimate the regression models 
including investors’ past returns, change in past returns, or both, as control variables. The results 
show that the levels of investors’ past returns have no significant effect in any of the regression 
models. Changes in investors’ past returns do impact behavior, but including them does not 
eliminate the explanatory power of investor perceptions (detailed results available upon request). 
In line with Statman et al.’s (2006) findings, changes in investors’ past returns have a significant 
effect in the turnover regression (β = 0.013, p = 0.004), which also includes past returns as a 
control variable, and in the buy-sell ratio regression models that include only the investors’ 
change in past returns, as well as both the past returns and change in past returns (β = 0.011, p = 
0.000 in both models). The significance, signs, and approximate magnitudes of the investor 
perception coefficients do not change in any of the regression models. The only exception is that 
in the risk-taking (standard deviation of portfolio return) regression models that include the 
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change in past returns, or both the past returns and the change in past returns, the coefficient for 
the change in risk perception becomes significant and positive (β = 0.009, p = 0.072 in both 
models). All in all, the analyses of this section show that investor perceptions not only pick up 
information from past returns, but they also provide explanatory power for investor behavior 
well beyond the previously documented effect of past returns and changes in past returns.  
 
4.3 Relevance of Investor Risk-Taking and Trading Behavior During the Crisis 
Results of Section 3 show that investor perceptions and fluctuations therein are important drivers 
of investor behavior. The aspects of trading and risk-trading behavior that we study have been 
shown to be related to investor performance during normal market periods. Thus, economically, 
they matter. In this section we assess whether, also during the financial crisis, the behavioral 
variables that we study are related to investor performance, and thus have relevance in this 
particular period. To do so, we regress three measures of investor performance on investor 
behavior and a set of controls. As performance measures, we study investors’ portfolio return, 
their Sharpe-Ratio, and their one-factor (Jensen’s) alpha.2 The aspects of investor behavior that 
we include are based on Section 3: We examine the impact of the standard deviation of 
investors’ portfolio return, as well as that of their buy-sell ratio, likelihood to trade, and turnover. 
Note that, since investment risk is already accounted for in the dependent variable in the Sharpe-
Ratio and alpha regression, only in the portfolio-return regression do we include the standard 
deviation of returns as an independent variable. The results of Table 9 show that the behavioral 
variables that we consider in this paper are important drivers of investor performance during the 
financial crisis. As overall market returns were mostly negative during the sample period, both 
                                                 
2
 We cannot estimate multi-factor alphas in this paper because of limitations on the portfolio-holdings data. 
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portfolio risk (standard deviation) and the buy-sell ratio are negatively associated with 
performance. In addition, trading activity (turnover), is negatively related to performance, 
consistent with results obtained in normal market periods (Barber and Odean 2000). Overall, 
these regression results provide evidence that the investor behaviors that we study during the 
financial crisis are economically relevant. 
 
[Table 9 here] 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we combine monthly survey data with matching brokerage records to create a 
unique set of panel data that shows how individual investor perceptions change and drive trading 
and risk-taking behavior during the financial crisis of 2007–2009. The results show that investor 
perceptions exhibit significant fluctuation over the course of the crisis, with risk tolerance and 
risk perceptions being less volatile than return expectations. At the start of the crisis, investors’ 
return expectations and risk tolerance sharply decline, while their risk perceptions strongly 
increase. Towards the end of the crisis, however, return expectations, risk tolerance, and risk 
perceptions quickly recover. We find substantial swings in trading and risk-taking behavior 
during the crisis that are driven by changes in investor perceptions. Contrary to conventional 
wisdom, however, individual investors did not stop trading altogether or de-risk their portfolios. 
In fact, as perceptions recovered, trading and risk-taking behavior soon returned to pre-crisis 
levels. Thus, although the uncertainty and volatility of the financial crisis had a significant effect 
on investors’ perceptions and behavior, these effects do not seem to be particularly long-lasting.  
 This study provides two insights for asset pricing. First, in contrast to Brunnermeier and 
Nagel (2008), we show that investor’s risk tolerance is time-varying (see Figure 2) and 
significantly related to risk-taking behavior (see the risk-taking regression). Investor’s portfolio 
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risk, however, seems to move in parallel with market risk (see Figure 3), as if changes in risk 
tolerance had no material impact. Hence, it may be investor inertia, that is, the large fraction of 
investors not trading during the sample period (see Figure 5), as well as rebalancing behavior 
after price changes (see Figure 4 and the buy-sell ratio regression), that ultimately drives 
portfolio risk. The impact of time-varying risk tolerance on risk-taking behavior discovered here 
may be masked and overcompensated by the impact of investor inertia found by Brunnermeier 
and Nagel (2008). Second, although the sample period does not cover the time before the crisis, 
this paper’s findings on the evolution of investor perceptions shed light on the psychological 
factors contributing to the asset-price bubble preceding the crisis. Barberis (2011), for example, 
argues that the representativeness heuristic (i.e., people tend to base their predictions on small 
and recent samples) is largely responsible for the overly optimistic formation of pre-crisis 
expectations. This paper’s results show that individual investor perceptions indeed exhibit 
adaptive behavior with respect to very recent stock-market performance (see Figures 1-2). We 
thus provide empirical support for Barberis’s (2011) theoretical viewpoint regarding the 
psychological factors that contributed to the financial crisis of 2007–2009.    
 This study’s results have implications for crisis management. Changes in investors’ 
perceptions over time drive such key behaviors as trading frequency, turnover, buy-sell ratio, and 
risk taking. In particular, investor perceptions have explanatory power for their behavior well 
beyond previously documented effects of past returns. Individual investors’ aggregate trading 
behavior influences stock prices (Kumar and Lee 2006), return volatility (Foucault, Sraer, and 
Thesmar 2011), and ultimately even the macro-economy (Korniotis and Kumar 2011). 
Therefore, frequently collected information about individual investors’ perceptions could be a 
crucial input for an integrative communication strategy aimed to moderate individual investor 
perceptions so as to prevent destabilizing investment behavior. 
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Table 1 
Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
Gender Indicator variable taking the value 0 for male investors and 1 for female investors. 
Age Age of the investor in years as of April 2008. 
Account Tenure Account tenure of the investor in years as of April 2008.  
Income Annual disposable income in 2007 (equals gross income minus taxes and social security 
contributions). Assigned to each investor based on their 6-digit postal code. This postal 
code is unique for each street in the Netherlands. Data source is the average net income 
per 6-digit postal code from Statistics Netherlands (Central Bureau of Statistics). 
Portfolio Value Value of investment assets in an investor’s account at the end of the month. 
House Value Value of house in 2008. Assigned to each investor based on their 6-digit postal code. 
This postal code is unique for each street in the Netherlands. Data source is the average 
residential house value per 6-digit postal code from Statistics Netherlands (Central 
Bureau of Statistics). 
Derivatives Indicator variable taking the value 1 if an investor traded an option or futures contract at 
least once during the sample period or 0 otherwise. 
Traded Indicator variable taking the value 1 if an investor traded in a particular month or 0 
otherwise. 
Trades Number of all executed transactions in a particular month. 
Volume Sum of the absolute values of all purchases and sales in a particular month. 
Turnover Volume divided by the average of the portfolio values at the beginning and end of a 
particular month. 
Dividend Choice Stock Indicator variable taking the value 1 if the investor's preferred way to receive dividend is 
stock dividend or 0 in case of a preference for cash dividend. 
Dividend Choice Cash & 
Stock 
Indicator variable taking the value 1 if the investor's preferred way to receive dividend is 
stock dividend for one of her subaccounts and cash for another subaccount or 0 in case of 
a preference for cash dividend for all her subaccounts.   
Average Trade Size The investor’s monthly volume divided by her trades. 
Buy-Sell Ratio Difference between volume buy and volume sell, normalized (divided) by volume. For 
investors with no trades in a particular month, this ratio is set to zero (such investors 
mimic an investor with equal buy and sell volume). 
Return Monthly investor return given by the product of the daily relative changes in the value of 
her portfolio after transaction costs and portfolio in- and outflows. 
Sharpe Ratio Return divided by the standard deviation of return. 
Alpha Monthly one-factor alpha (Jensen’s alpha). 
Return Expectation Reflects how optimistic a respondent is about her investment portfolio and its returns in 
the upcoming month. Details on the survey questions are given in Table 3.  
Risk Tolerance Reflects a respondent’s general predisposition toward financial risk. Details on the 
survey questions are given in Table 3.   
Risk Perception Reflects a respondent’s interpretation of how risky the stock market will be in the 
upcoming month. Details on the survey questions are given in Table 3.    
 
Because of data availability, data retrieved from Statistics Netherlands refer to different years, that is, to 2007 for 
income and to 2008 for house value. 
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Table 2  
Descriptive Statistics 
Month Apr-08 May-08 Jun-08 Jul-08 Aug-08 Sep-08 Oct-08 Nov-08 Dec-08 Jan-09 Feb-09 Mar-09
Investors N 1,376 1,376 1,376 1,376 1,376 1,376 1,376 1,376 1,376 1,376 1,376 1,376
Gender 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
Age mean 50.55 50.55 50.55 50.55 50.55 50.55 50.55 50.55 50.55 50.55 50.55 50.55
Account Tenure mean 4.07 4.07 4.07 4.07 4.07 4.07 4.07 4.07 4.07 4.07 4.07 4.07
Income € mean 20,231 20,231 20,231 20,231 20,231 20,231 20,231 20,231 20,231 20,231 20,231 20,231
Income € median 19,300 19,300 19,300 19,300 19,300 19,300 19,300 19,300 19,300 19,300 19,300 19,300
Portfolio Value € mean 52,892 52,751 44,919 42,906 46,028 37,754 31,224 30,192 30,771 29,649 26,589 27,949
Portfolio Value € median 12,108 12,305 10,175 9,912 11,172 8,481 6,907 6,465 6,743 6,543 6,231 6,739
House Value € mean 278,982 278,982 278,982 278,982 278,982 278,982 278,982 278,982 278,982 278,982 278,982 278,982
House Value € median 261,500 261,500 261,500 261,500 261,500 261,500 261,500 261,500 261,500 261,500 261,500 261,500
Fraction Derivatives 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39
Fraction Traded 0.47 0.47 0.49 0.47 0.40 0.51 0.63 0.43 0.37 0.41 0.40 0.42
Trades (Traders) mean 8.57 7.54 7.71 9.24 7.16 8.71 10.62 8.81 7.80 9.63 8.85 10.13
Trades (Traders) median 4.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 3.50 3.00 4.00 3.00 4.00
Volume € (Traders) mean 48,049 30,285 33,048 36,291 30,861 41,342 51,039 31,140 22,902 28,456 25,956 29,548
Volume € (Traders) median 7,323 7,306 6,477 6,022 4,278 5,965 6,183 5,279 3,736 4,388 4,373 4,930
Turnover (Traders) mean 1.10 0.91 0.84 1.19 0.92 1.23 1.99 1.46 1.22 1.60 1.33 1.57
Turnover (Traders) median 0.29 0.25 0.25 0.29 0.18 0.26 0.42 0.31 0.22 0.27 0.26 0.32
Panel A: All Brokerage Accounts
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Table 2  
Descriptive Statistics – continued 
 
Month Apr-08 May-08 Jun-08 Jul-08 Aug-08 Sep-08 Oct-08 Nov-08 Dec-08 Jan-09 Feb-09 Mar-09
Investors N 787 701 605 557 520 491 654 402 330 312 272 291
Gender 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09
Age mean 50.55 51.22 51.50 51.83 52.79 52.60 51.49 52.30 52.66 52.62 53.80 53.23
Account Tenure mean 3.93 3.98 4.09 3.98 4.11 4.08 4.24 4.33 4.33 4.43 4.51 4.36
Income € mean 20,166 20,066 20,079 19,973 20,078 19,985 20,139 19,867 19,844 20,015 20,025 20,016
Income € median 19,200 19,200 19,200 19,200 19,200 19,200 19,200 19,200 19,100 19,000 19,200 19,100
Portfolio Value € mean 54,446 54,264 45,411 45,509 49,557 39,707 29,968 33,953 30,078 31,059 27,814 27,584
Portfolio Value € median 12,731 13,569 10,970 10,558 13,547 10,179 7,898 7,862 9,141 8,358 8,357 8,611
House Value € mean 277,086 273,145 271,955 273,254 274,079 274,452 278,463 272,460 271,801 273,281 277,193 273,037
House Value € median 259,000 258,000 253,000 254,000 258,000 255,000 261,500 259,000 259,000 260,000 261,000 257,000
Fraction Derivatives 0.41 0.42 0.43 0.42 0.44 0.44 0.38 0.38 0.41 0.45 0.41 0.41
Fraction Traded 0.52 0.54 0.55 0.52 0.46 0.54 0.64 0.46 0.43 0.48 0.49 0.45
Trades (Traders) mean 9.23 7.08 7.94 8.40 6.68 8.54 10.89 8.61 7.21 10.14 10.02 9.69
Trades (Traders) median 4.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
Volume € (Traders) mean 56,262 24,814 31,821 27,447 22,637 28,375 55,621 30,293 22,924 35,560 31,069 27,483
Volume € (Traders) median 7,375 6,233 6,538 6,358 4,012 5,965 6,948 5,280 3,660 5,285 3,670 6,605
Turnover (Traders) mean 1.30 0.86 0.97 1.14 0.71 0.99 2.18 1.71 0.94 1.11 1.40 1.99
Turnover (Traders) median 0.30 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.17 0.21 0.40 0.24 0.17 0.24 0.23 0.32
Return Expectation mean 4.29 4.18 3.57 3.78 4.11 3.47 3.39 3.60 3.74 3.97 3.55 4.17
Risk Tolerance mean 3.92 3.93 3.59 3.77 3.86 3.58 3.66 3.70 3.78 3.73 3.70 3.86
Risk Perception mean 4.49 4.45 5.01 4.17 3.99 4.43 4.27 4.26 4.24 4.19 4.45 4.23
Panel B: Survey Respondents
 
 
This table presents monthly summary statistics for the brokerage account data. Panel A refers to all investors for whom brokerage records are available. This 
sample includes investors who participated at least once during the entire sample period in the survey and who were not excluded by the sample-selection 
restrictions as defined in section 2. The monthly summary statistics presented in Panel B refer to the subset of investors who responded to the survey in each 
respective month. Variables are defined in Table 1. 
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Table 3 
Survey Questions 
 
 
This table presents the questions as used in this study’s 12 consecutive monthly surveys. A 7-point Likert scale is 
used to record investors’ response to each question. Each survey variable (return expectation, risk tolerance, risk 
perception) is calculated as the equally weighted average of the respective survey questions. * denotes a reverse-
scored question. All survey variables are measured using psychometrically validated measurement scales (Nunnally 
and Bernstein 1994). Cronbach’s alpha is between 0.71 and 0.89 for all survey variables, indicating the 
measurement instrument is reliable (Hair et al. 1998). 
Survey Variable Answer Categories 
Return Expectation (1 = low/pessimistic, 7 = high/optimistic)  
Next month, I expect my investments to do less well than desired. 1 (totally agree)–7 (totally disagree) 
For the next month, I have a positive feeling about my financial 
future.* 
1 (totally agree)–7 (totally disagree) 
Next month, my investments will have a worse performance than 
those of most other investors. 
1 (totally agree)–7 (totally disagree) 
Next month, it is unlikely that my investment behavior will lead to 
positive returns. 
1 (totally agree)–7 (totally disagree) 
For the next month, the future of my investment portfolio looks 
good.* 
1 (totally agree)–7 (totally disagree) 
  
Risk Tolerance (1 = low risk tolerance, 7 = high risk tolerance)  
Next month, I prefer certainty over uncertainty when investing. 1 (totally agree)–7 (totally disagree) 
Next month, I avoid risks when investing.  1 (totally agree)–7 (totally disagree) 
Next month, I do not like to take financial risks. 1 (totally agree)–7 (totally disagree) 
Next month, I do not like to “play it safe” when investing.* 1 (totally agree)–7 (totally disagree) 
  
Risk Perception (1 = low perceived risk, 7 = high perceived risk) 
 
I consider investing to be very risky next month.* 1 (totally agree)–7 (totally disagree) 
I consider investing to be safe next month. 1 (totally agree)–7 (totally disagree) 
I consider investing to be dangerous next month. * 1 (totally agree)–7 (totally disagree) 
I consider investing to have little risk next month.  1 (totally agree)–7 (totally disagree) 
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Table 4  
Risk-Taking Behavior  
Dependent Variable
Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err.
Return Expectation prev. month 0.006 0.009 -0.008 0.022
∆ Return Expectation 0.002 0.007 -0.030 0.021
Risk Tolerance prev. month 0.030 0.009 *** 0.060 0.017 ***
∆ Risk Tolerance 0.014 0.005 *** 0.067 0.016 ***
Risk Perception prev. month 0.017 0.006 *** -0.029 0.015 *
∆ Risk Perception 0.007 0.004 -0.013 0.013
Gender -0.022 0.022 0.019 0.057
Age 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001
Account Tenure 0.006 0.003 * -0.009 0.006
ln(Income) 0.097 0.057 * -0.215 0.171
ln(Portfolio Value) prev. month -0.049 0.007 *** -0.055 0.010 ***
ln(House Value) -0.028 0.034 0.181 0.078 **
Derivatives 0.115 0.019 *** -0.175 0.043 ***
Dividend Choice Stock 0.021 0.023 0.007 0.045
Dividend Choice Cash & Stock 0.026 0.018 0.003 0.040
Constant 0.077 0.389 0.525 1.145
Time fixed effects
N Observations
N Investors
R2
Buy-Sell Ratio
YES
1,914
968
0.091
Std(Return)
YES
3,885
1,041
0.262
 
 
This table presents the results from regressions of risk-taking behavior on investor perceptions and a set of control 
variables. Dependent variables are the standard deviation of investors’ daily portfolio returns and the buy-sell ratio. 
The columns show results of linear panel models for the full sample (standard deviation of return) and for the 
truncated sample of investors who have at least one trade in a particular month (buy-sell ratio). The number of 
individual investors included the first regression (1,041) is smaller than the sample available for analysis (1,376), 
because not all investors responded to the survey for two consecutive months. Standard errors are clustered on the 
investor level. Variables are defined in Table 1. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively.  
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Table 5  
Trading Activity  
Dependent Variable
Marg. Eff. Std. err. Coef. Std. err.
Return Expectation prev. month 0.094 0.019 *** 0.069 0.042 *
∆ Return Expectation 0.054 0.016 *** 0.062 0.034 *
Risk Tolerance prev. month 0.076 0.015 *** 0.030 0.030
∆ Risk Tolerance 0.069 0.013 *** -0.017 0.027
Risk Perception prev. month 0.028 0.013 ** 0.065 0.024 ***
∆ Risk Perception 0.016 0.010 0.053 0.017 ***
Gender 0.046 0.070 -0.133 0.089
Age 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.003 *
Account Tenure -0.014 0.007 ** 0.021 0.012 *
ln(Income) 0.313 0.181 * 0.495 0.330
ln(Portfolio Value) prev. month 0.068 0.010 *** -0.130 0.024 ***
ln(House Value) -0.197 0.090 ** -0.420 0.190 **
Derivatives 0.475 0.037 *** 0.004 0.079
Dividend Choice Stock 0.010 0.052 0.304 0.103 ***
Dividend Choice Cash & Stock -0.046 0.045 0.146 0.068 **
Constant 1.264 1.833
Time fixed effects
N Observations
N Investors
R2 0.108
3,885 1,914
YES YES
1,041 698
Traded Turnover
 
 
This table presents the results from regressions of two indicators of investor trading activity on investor perceptions 
and a set of control variables. Dependent variables are market participation (Traded) and turnover. The first column 
shows the results of a random-effects panel probit estimation for the dependent variable Traded, which indicates 
whether an investor traded in a particular month (1) or not (0). Reported are marginal effects at means (0) of 
independent continuous (discrete dummy) variables. The number of individual investors included the regression 
(1,041) is smaller than the sample available for analysis (1,376), because not all investors responded to the survey 
for two consecutive months. The second column shows results of a linear panel model for the truncated sample of 
investors who have at least one trade in a particular month. Standard errors are clustered on the investor level for the 
linear panel model. Variables are defined in Table 1. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 6  
Sample Differences Between Survey Respondents and Non-Respondents 
Apr-08 May-08 Jun-08 Jul-08 Aug-08 Sep-08 Oct-08 Nov-08 Dec-08 Jan-09 Feb-09 Mar-09
Gender -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
Age 0.07 1.28 * 1.73 ** 2.18 *** 3.63 *** 3.26 *** 1.95 ** 2.52 *** 2.76 *** 2.63 *** 4.05 *** 3.40 ***
Account Tenure -0.29 ** -0.19 0.02 -0.16 0.05 0.02 0.36 ** 0.39 ** 0.35 * 0.45 *** 0.55 *** 0.37 **
Income € -97 -335 -244 -462 * -255 -386 -212 -508 ** -505 ** -265 -257 -270
Portfolio Value € 3,566 3,195 644 4,911 6,094 2,686 4,000 5,274 -872 2,955 1,529 -464
House Value € -4,452 -11,950 ** -12,572 ** -9,646 -7,899 -7,066 -1,038 -9,223 -9,455 -7,387 -2,229 -7,539
Fraction Derivatives 0.05 * 0.06 ** 0.07 ** 0.05 ** 0.08 *** 0.07 ** -0.04 -0.01 0.02 0.07 ** 0.03 0.02
Fraction Traded 0.13 *** 0.13 *** 0.12 *** 0.09 *** 0.09 *** 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.07 ** 0.09 *** 0.10 *** 0.04
Std(Return) 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03
Buy-Sell Ratio (Traders) 0.09 * 0.11 ** -0.01 -0.06 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.19 *** -0.02 0.05
Trades (Traders) 1.78 ** -1.12 0.39 -1.59 -0.82 -0.30 1.02 -0.36 -0.82 0.70 1.52 -0.57
Volume € (Traders) 22,218 -13,045 ** -2,788 -16,300 * -14,690 * -20,923 ** 14,810 -1,462 30 9,697 6,716 -2,674
Turnover (Traders) 0.54 *** -0.13 0.26 -0.11 -0.38 -0.39 0.37 0.35 -0.37 -0.67 0.08 0.54
Return 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.00
Sharpe Ratio 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.03 * 0.01 0.01 0.00
Alpha 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 ** -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01
 
 
This table presents the monthly differences in means between respondents and non-respondents. Variables are defined in Table 1. *, **, *** denote statistical 
significant differences in means between respondents and non-respondents at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7  
Correlations between Investor Perceptions and Returns  
Return 
Expectation
Risk       
Tolerance
Risk    
Perception
AEX Monthly 
Return
Risk Tolerance 0.29***
Risk Perception -0.34*** -0.12***
AEX Monthly Return 0.30*** 0.09*** -0.04***
Investor Monthly Return 0.19*** 0.00 -0.07*** 0.49***
∆ Return 
Expectation
∆ Risk    
Tolerance
∆ Risk 
Perception
∆ AEX 
Monthly Return
∆ Risk Tolerance 0.20***
∆ Risk Perception -0.26*** -0.10***
∆ AEX Monthly Return 0.37*** 0.13*** -0.17***
∆ Investor Monthly Return 0.21*** 0.03* -0.08*** 0.20***
Panel A: Correlation Matrix for Levels in Perceptions and Returns
Panel B: Correlation Matrix for Changes in Perceptions and Returns
 
 
This table presents the Pearson correlation coefficients between (end-of-month) investor perceptions and the 
corresponding (i.e., for the same month) realized total return on the Dutch stock market index (AEX), and individual 
investor returns. Panel A refers to levels in perceptions and returns, while Panel B refers to changes in perceptions 
and returns. Variables are defined in Table 1. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively.  
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Table 8  
Changes in Investor Perceptions by Month and Monthly Returns  
Month May-08 Jun-08 Jul-08 Aug-08 Sep-08 Oct-08 Nov-08 Dec-08 Jan-09 Feb-09 Mar-09
AEX Monthly Return % + 2.82 – 12.22 – 6.01 + 4.17 – 19.65 – 19.15 – 5.19 – 2.47 + 1.14 – 11.21 – 0.76
∆
 AEX Monthly Return % Points – 5.88 – 15.04 + 6.21 + 10.18 – 23.83 + 0.51 + 13.95 + 2.72 + 3.61 – 12.35 + 10.45
Mean ∆ Return Expectation – 0.11 – 0.61 + 0.22 + 0.33 – 0.64 – 0.08 + 0.21 + 0.14 + 0.23 – 0.41 + 0.62
Mean ∆ Risk Tolerance + 0.01 – 0.34 + 0.19 + 0.08 – 0.28 + 0.08 + 0.04 + 0.07 – 0.04 – 0.03 + 0.16
Mean ∆ Risk Perception – 0.04 + 0.56 – 0.84 – 0.18 + 0.44 – 0.17 – 0.01 – 0.02 – 0.05 + 0.27 – 0.22
∆
 Return Expectation >= 0 % Investors 47 23 56 67 23 38 61 50 60 31 72
∆
 Risk Tolerance >= 0 % Investors 51 40 56 57 35 46 55 52 48 54 52
∆
 Risk Perception >= 0 % Investors 56 63 34 46 67 58 47 51 52 57 38
Month May-08 Jun-08 Jul-08 Aug-08 Sep-08 Oct-08 Nov-08 Dec-08 Jan-09 Feb-09 Mar-09
Mean Monthly Return % + 0.70 – 14.73 – 7.06 + 5.71 – 19.82 – 18.62 – 8.71 – 1.91 + 0.41 – 13.16 + 1.19
Mean ∆ Monthly Return % Points – 3.20 – 15.43 + 7.67 + 12.77 – 25.53 + 1.20 + 9.92 + 6.80 + 2.32 – 13.57 + 14.36
Mean ∆ Return Expectation – 0.11 – 0.61 + 0.22 + 0.33 – 0.64 – 0.08 + 0.21 + 0.14 + 0.23 – 0.41 + 0.62
Mean ∆ Risk Tolerance + 0.01 – 0.34 + 0.19 + 0.08 – 0.28 + 0.08 + 0.04 + 0.07 – 0.04 – 0.03 + 0.16
Mean ∆ Risk Perception – 0.04 + 0.56 – 0.84 – 0.18 + 0.44 – 0.17 – 0.01 – 0.02 – 0.05 + 0.27 – 0.22
∆
 Return Expectation >= 0 and Return >= 0 % Investors 50 22 69 68 50 24 64 53 62 50 77
∆
 Return Expectation >= 0 and Return < 0 % Investors 42 23 53 56 22 41 60 48 57 29 64
∆
 Risk Tolerance >= 0 and Return >= 0 % Investors 51 39 60 58 30 48 57 53 51 55 54
∆
 Risk Tolerance >= 0 and Return < 0 % Investors 51 40 55 50 35 46 54 51 43 54 49
∆
 Risk Perception >= 0 and Return >= 0 % Investors 53 83 30 46 80 56 37 49 57 64 36
∆
 Risk Perception >= 0 and Return < 0 % Investors 60 63 35 42 66 59 49 52 45 57 41
∆
 Return Expectation >= 0 and ∆ Return >= 0 % Investors 51 26 58 68 50 39 59 56 62 53 77
∆
 Return Expectation >= 0 and ∆ Return < 0 % Investors 46 23 47 46 22 38 66 38 56 29 36
∆
 Risk Tolerance >= 0 and ∆ Return >= 0 % Investors 52 26 56 58 22 43 52 53 49 53 53
∆
 Risk Tolerance >= 0 and ∆ Return < 0 % Investors 50 40 56 49 36 48 64 50 45 54 44
∆
 Risk Perception >= 0 and ∆ Return >= 0 % Investors 53 74 36 46 61 49 44 47 56 68 37
∆
 Risk Perception >= 0 and ∆ Return < 0 % Investors 57 63 25 43 67 65 57 59 46 56 44
Panel B: Change in Perceptions versus Individual Investor Returns
Panel A: Change in Perceptions versus the Market Return (AEX)
 
 
This table presents the monthly changes in investor perceptions and returns. Panel A compares changes in investor perceptions with changes in the total return on 
the Dutch stock market index (AEX). Panel B compares changes in investor perceptions with changes in individual investor returns and distinguishes further 
between investors with positive and negative returns as well as changes in return experience. Variables are defined in Table 1.  
35 
 
Table 9  
Investor Performance 
Dependent Variable
Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err.
Gender 0.001 0.007 -0.025 0.029 -0.005 0.010
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
Account Tenure 0.002 0.001 ** 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.001
ln(Income) 0.002 0.022 0.056 0.083 -0.042 0.032
ln(Portfolio Value) prev. month 0.000 0.002 -0.009 0.005 0.005 0.002 **
ln(House Value) 0.011 0.012 0.013 0.041 0.019 0.017
Derivatives -0.011 0.006 * 0.006 0.022 -0.009 0.007
Dividend Choice Stock -0.004 0.007 0.003 0.022 -0.007 0.008
Dividend Choice Cash & Stock -0.006 0.005 0.006 0.019 -0.004 0.007
Std(Return) -0.309 0.022 ***
Buy-Sell Ratio -0.019 0.005 *** -0.079 0.018 *** -0.017 0.006 ***
Traded -0.005 0.005 0.023 0.019 -0.005 0.007
Turnover -0.008 0.002 *** -0.007 0.003 *** -0.011 0.003 ***
Constant -0.191 0.150 -1.202 0.523 ** 0.174 0.190
Time fixed effects
N Observations
N Investors
R2
3,885 3,885
1,041 1,041
0.492 0.585
3,885
1,041
0.056
YES YES YES
Return Sharpe Ratio Alpha
 
 
This table presents the results from regressions of investment performance on investor behavior and a set of control variables. Dependent variables are the 
investor’s return, Sharpe Ratio, and alpha. The columns show results of linear panel models. The number of individual investors included the regression (1,041) 
is smaller than the sample available for analysis (1,376), because not all investors responded to the survey for two consecutive months. Standard errors are 
clustered on the investor level. Variables are defined in Table 1. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Figure 1. Return Expectations. Return expectations are measured on a 7-point Likert scale (see Table 3); shown is 
the sample mean. A small value indicates low return expectations, whereas a large value indicates high return 
expectations. AEX return is the total return of the Dutch stock market index. *, **, *** denote statistical significant 
differences between the means for subsequent month pairs for return expectations at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively.  
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Figure 2. Risk Tolerance and Risk Perception. Risk tolerance and risk perception about investment prospects are 
measured on a 7-point Likert scale (see Table 3); shown is the sample mean. For illustrative purposes, risk 
perception is shown on an inverted scale. A small value indicates low risk tolerance or high perceived risk, whereas 
a large value indicates high risk tolerance or low perceived risk. AEX return is the total return of the Dutch stock 
market index. * (+), ** (++), *** (+++) denote statistical significant differences between the means for subsequent 
month pairs for risk tolerance (risk perception) at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Figure 3. Investors’ Monthly Return Volatility. Investor realized volatility is calculated based on the daily returns 
on their portfolio. AEX realized volatility is calculated for each month based on the daily total returns of the AEX 
index. All volatilities are depicted in monthly terms. Variables are defined in Table 1. 
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Figure 4. Investors’ Buy Sell Ratio (Traders). AEX return is the total return of the Dutch stock market index. 
Variables are defined in Table 1.  
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Figure 5. Trading Activity – Fraction of Investors that Traded and Turnover. AEX return is the total return of 
the Dutch stock market index. Variables are defined in Table 1. 
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Figure 6. Divergence of Perceptions and Trading Volume. Shown are the monthly cross-sectional standard 
deviations of return expectation, risk tolerance, and risk perception, as well as the mean of the monthly volume (buy 
+ sell) per investor. Variables are defined in Table 1. 
 
 
